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Abstract
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms
for one-sided matching markets, where a set of n agents
needs to be matched to a set of n heterogeneous items. Each
agent i has a value vi,j for each item j, and these values are
private information that the agents may misreport if doing
so leads to a preferred outcome. Ensuring that the agents
have no incentive to misreport requires a careful design of
the matching mechanism, and mechanisms proposed in the
literature mitigate this issue by eliciting only the ordinal
preferences of the agents, i.e., their ranking of the items
from most to least preferred. However, the efficiency guar-
antees of these mechanisms are based only on weak measures
that are oblivious to the underlying values. In this paper
we achieve stronger performance guarantees by introducing
a mechanism that truthfully elicits the full cardinal prefer-
ences of the agents, i.e., all of the vi,j values. We evaluate
the performance of this mechanism using the much more de-
manding Nash bargaining solution as a benchmark, and we
prove that our mechanism significantly outperforms all or-
dinal mechanisms (even non-truthful ones). To prove our
approximation bounds, we also study the population mono-
tonicity of the Nash bargaining solution in the context of
matching markets, providing both upper and lower bounds
which are of independent interest.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the classic “house allocation”
problem of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). A set of n
agents are to be matched, one-to-one, to a set of n items
and each agent i has a value vi,j for each item j. A
randomized matching mechanism outputs a probability
distribution over matchings, which corresponds to a
doubly-stochastic matrix p, providing the probability
pi,j that i will be matched to j; the expected utility
of i in p is
∑
j vi,jpi,j . The goal in this setting is
to generate a fair and efficient randomized matching,
which crucially depends on the values of the agents,
and the main obstacle is the fact that the vi,j values
of each agent i are private information of this agent.
Therefore, a successful mechanism needs to elicit the
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agents’ preferences and output a desired matching; on
the other hand, each agent’s goal is to maximize her
expected utility, so an agent can strategically misreport
her preferences if this increases her expected utility.
This tension between the objectives of the designer
and those of the participants lies at the core of the sub-
field of economics known as mechanism design. Most of
the proposed solutions in the mechanism design litera-
ture, however, leverage monetary payments as the main
tool that the designer can use to incentivize truthful re-
porting by the agents. This is in contrast to the match-
ing mechanisms in the house allocation setting which
cannot use such payments, making the mechanism de-
sign problem considered in this paper particularly de-
manding. In the absence of monetary payments, an
alternative tool for simulating the impact of payments
is to use “money burning” (Hartline and Roughgarden,
2008). In our setting, this could correspond to keeping
some of the items unmatched with positive probability,
thus penalizing the agents just like monetary payments
would. But, in many settings, including the house allo-
cation problem studied in this paper, this would be un-
acceptable (e.g., it would imply that some agents may
remain homeless while some houses remain unoccupied).
Our main result is a novel application of random
sampling that enables the use of known money burning
mechanisms, while ensuring that every agent and item is
matched. In other words, our technique takes advantage
of the improved incentives that these money-burning
mechanisms provide, but without suffering their most
important drawback. To verify the usefulness of this ap-
proach, we combine it with the partial allocation (PA)
mechanism of Cole et al. (2013), giving rise to a new
mechanism that incentivizes the agents to always truth-
fully report their cardinal preferences, i.e., their vi,j val-
ues, and yields an outcome p that is approximately both
fair and efficient.1 We measure the performance of our
mechanism using the canonical benchmark defined by
the Nash bargaining solution and show that our mech-
anism outperforms the standard mechanisms with the
same, or weaker, incentive properties.
1Zhou (1990) shows that there is no mechanism that is
truthful, symmetric, and Pareto efficient; thus, some notion of
approximation is necessary.
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The literature on one-sided matching has consid-
ered three main approaches, none of which gives rise
to mechanisms that are both truthful and obtain a
non-trivial approximation of the aforementioned bench-
mark. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) propose the com-
petitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI), which
depends on the vi,j values in a non-trivial way, but it
provides the agents with strong incentives to misreport
these values, especially for small problem instances. The
random serial dictatorship (RSD), or random priority,
mechanism is an important mechanism with a long his-
tory in practice. This mechanism randomly orders the
agents and, following this order, gives to each agent
her favorite item among the ones that are still avail-
able. RSD is an ordinal mechanism: it requires only
the ordinal preferences of each agent, i.e., only her rank-
ing of the items from most to least preferred. It elic-
its this information truthfully, but its outcomes can be
very inefficient. The probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism
of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) is another ordinal
mechanism, and its outcome is computed by continu-
ously allocating to each agent portions of her most pre-
ferred item that has not already been fully allocated. PS
satisfies an ordinal notion of efficiency, but it achieves
only a trivial approximation of our stronger benchmark,
and it is not truthful. We provide a more detailed dis-
cussion regarding these mechanisms and other related
work in Section 7.
Aiming to provide stronger efficiency and fairness
guarantees compared to known mechanisms, we con-
sider a cardinal benchmark: the well-studied Nash bar-
gaining solution, proposed by Nash (1950). Given a
disagreement point, i.e., the “status quo” that would
arise if negotiations among the agents were to break
down, the Nash bargaining solution is the outcome that
maximizes the product of the agents’ marginal utilities
relative to their utility for the disagreement point. This
outcome indicates the utility that each agent “deserves”,
so we use this utility as the benchmark for that agent.
The choice of disagreement point can depend on the
application at hand: if a buyer and a seller are nego-
tiating a transaction, the disagreement point could be
that the seller keeps the goods and the buyer keeps her
money. In one-sided matching markets the disagree-
ment point needs to be a matching because leaving an
agent without a house is infeasible. Since all agents
have symmetric claims on the items when entering the
market, we let the disagreement point be a matching
chosen uniformly at random, ensuring that each agent
is equally likely to be matched to each item. The Nash
bargaining solution therefore corresponds to the doubly-
stochastic matrix p that maximizes
∏
i(
∑
j vi,jpi,j−oi),
where oi =
1
n
∑
j vi,j is the expected utility of agent i
for an item chosen uniformly at random.
Since no truthful and symmetric mechanism can
guarantee Pareto efficiency (Zhou, 1990), it is clearly
impossible for a truthful mechanism to implement
the Nash bargaining solution, which is symmetric
and Pareto efficient. Thus, we consider the prob-
lem of approximating this solution. Specifically, the
Nash bargaining solution defines the utility that each
agent deserves and our goal is to ensure that every
agent receives a good approximation of that bench-
mark. Formally, a mechanism is a β-approximation
if the utility of each agent is at least a β fraction
of her utility in the Nash bargaining solution. Note
that, once the valuations of each agent i are ad-
justed by subtracting oi, then our objective corre-
sponds to the Nash social welfare (NSW), which has
recently received a lot of attention in the fair division
literature (e.g., Cole and Gkatzelis, 2018; Garg et al.,
2018; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Barman et al., 2018;
Braˆnzei et al., 2017). The NSW maximizing outcome
is proportionally fair in that it satisfies a multiplica-
tive version of Pareto efficiency, namely, the utility of
an agent cannot be increased by a multiplicative fac-
tor without decreasing the product of utilities of other
agents by a greater multiplicative factor.
En route to proving our mechanism’s approxima-
tion bounds, we also provide an analysis of the Nash
bargaining solution with respect to its population mono-
tonicity, which is of independent interest. It has long
been known that, unlike the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion, the Nash bargaining solution can violate popu-
lation monotonicity for some instances of the bargain-
ing problem (Thomson, 1983; Thomson and Lensberg,
1989). That is, there exist instances where removing
some of the agents and computing the updated Nash
bargaining solution can decrease the utility of some of
the remaining agents. When allocating items among
competing agents, this lack of monotonicity is somewhat
counterintuitive. Why would the decreased competition
from agents departing the market not lead to (weakly)
increased utility for the agents remaining in the market?
Indeed, we show that population monotonicity can be
violated in the Nash bargaining solution for matching
markets. Effectively, the constraint that the allocation
is a distribution over perfect matching introduces posi-
tive externalities between agents.
In order to quantify the extent to which one of
the remaining agents’ utility can drop after such a
change in the agent population, the bargaining litera-
ture in economics introduced the opportunity structure
notion (e.g., see the book by Thomson and Lensberg,
1989, and references therein). This structure identifies
the largest factor by which a remaining agent’s utility
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can drop after some subset of agents is removed. In fact,
resembling the standard computer science approach, the
opportunity structure is defined as the worst-case factor
over all instances, all removed subsets of agents, and all
remaining agents. In this paper we provide essentially
tight upper and lower bounds for this factor in the con-
text of matching markets, showing that in carefully de-
signed worst-case instances, this factor can grow faster
than a polylogarithmic function of the number of agents,
yet slower than any polynomial. Apart from the broader
interest in understanding this measure in matching mar-
kets, we show that the upper bound on the population
non-monotonicity provides, up to constant factors, an
upper bound on the approximation factor of the truth-
ful matching mechanism that we define.
Our Results. In this paper we introduce a random
sampling technique which allows us to translate non-
trivial truthful one-sided matching mechanisms that
may produce partial matchings (i.e., possibly leaving
some agents unmatched) into ones where (i) every agent
is always assigned an item, and (ii) the incentives for
truthful reporting of preferences are maintained. For
example, the truthfulness guarantee of the PA mecha-
nism of Cole et al. (2013) depends heavily on its ability
to penalize the agents that cause inconvenience to oth-
ers; it thereby ensures that none of these agents is mis-
reporting their preferences. Since monetary payments
are prohibited, this mechanism penalizes the agents by
assigning positive probability to outcomes that leave
them unmatched. Such partial matchings, however, are
unacceptable in the house allocation problem. Every
agent, no matter what values she reports, needs to be
guaranteed an item, and this constraint significantly re-
stricts our ability to introduce penalties. Nevertheless,
we show that we can still recreate such penalties by us-
ing random sampling. Applying our sampling technique
to the PA mechanism, we define the randomized partial
improvement (RPI) mechanism, which significantly out-
performs all the standard matching mechanisms with
respect to the Nash bargaining benchmark.
In essence, the RPI mechanism endows agents with
a baseline allocation given by a uniformly random item
and then uses the PA mechanism to improve the agents’
utility relative to this baseline. In reality, it is not
possible to simultaneously maintain the baseline and
offer improvements to all agents, so RPI circumvents
this impossibility by imposing these two conditions on
a sample of half of the agents instead. With half
the agents (but all of the items) there is sufficient
flexibility to faithfully implement the PA mechanism
with the outside option of a uniform random house.
After finalizing the allocation of the sampled agents,
RPI then recursively allocates the unallocated portions
of the items to the remaining agents.
As an intermediate step toward the theoretical anal-
ysis of RPI’s approximation factor, we study the extent
to which population monotonicity may be violated in
a one-sided matching market instance. We refer to an
instance as ρ-utility monotonic if removing a subset of
its agents can decrease a remaining agent’s utility in
the new Nash bargaining solution by a factor no more
than ρ. We show that, for a very carefully constructed
(and somewhat contrived) family of instances, ρ can be
as high as Ω(2
√
logn/2) and we complement this bound
with an essentially tight upper bound, by proving that
for any one-side matching instance ρ is no more than
O(22
√
logn) ⊆ o(nǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
Apart from the broader interest in understanding
the extent to which the Nash bargaining solution may
violate population monotonicity, our upper bound on ρ
also directly implies an upper bound for the approxi-
mation factor of RPI. Specifically, we prove that RPI
guarantees to every agent a 4 e ρ approximation of the
utility that she gets in the Nash bargaining bench-
mark. Therefore, as a corollary, we conclude that RPI
approximates the Nash bargaining benchmark within
O(22
√
logn) ⊆ o(nǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0, even with
the worst case choice of ρ. In stark contrast to this
upper bound, which is strictly better than any polyno-
mial, we show that the approximation factor of all ordi-
nal mechanisms (even ones that are not truthful, such
as probabilistic serial) grows linearly with the number
of agents. Therefore, our mechanism significantly out-
performs all ordinal mechanisms while at the same time
satisfying truthfulness.
Structure. Section 2 provides some preliminary
definitions and Section 3 formally introduces the bench-
mark and approximation measure used throughout the
paper. Our results showing that ordinal mechanisms
fail to achieve any non-trivial approximation are in Sec-
tion 4; Section 5 includes the description of our mecha-
nism and the proofs regarding its truthfulness and fair-
ness guarantees. Finally, in Section 6 we study the pop-
ulation monotonicity of the Nash bargaining solution
and provide both upper and lower bounds for it.
2 Preliminaries
Given a set N of n agents and a set M of n items, a
randomized matching can be represented by a doubly-
stochastic matrix p of marginal probabilities, where pi,j
denotes the marginal probability that agent i is allo-
cated item j. Clearly, any probability distribution over
matchings implies a double-stochastic matrix, and the
Birkhoff-von-Neumann theorem shows that any doubly-
stochastic matrix can be implemented as a probability
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distribution over matchings. Denote by v a matrix of
agent values where vi,j is the value of agent i for item
j. The expected utility of agent i for random matching
p is ui =
∑
j∈M vi,j pi,j . The random matching p that
a mechanism outputs when the agents’ reported values
are v is denoted by p(v).
For each agent i, her values vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,n) are
private and a matching mechanism must be designed to
properly elicit them. A mechanism is truthful if it is a
dominant strategy for each agent i to report her true
values. That is, if we let p(wi, v−i) denote the outcome
of the mechanism when agent i reports values wi and all
the other agents report values v−i, then a mechanism is
truthful if for every agent i, any matrix of values v, and
any misreports wi:∑
j∈M
vi,j pi,j(v) ≥
∑
j∈M
vi,j pi,j(wi, v−i).
Our benchmark, formally defined in the following
section, uses the Nash social welfare (NSW) objective
on appropriately adjusted agent valuations. The NSW
maximizing outcome is known to provide a balance be-
tween fairness and efficiency by maximizing the geomet-
ric mean (or, equivalently, the product) of the agents’
expected utilities, i.e., maxp
∏
i
(∑
j vi,j pi,j
)
. The par-
tial allocation mechanism from Cole et al. (2013) pro-
vides a truthful approximation of that outcome and can
be easily adapted to randomized matchings by inter-
preting fractional allocations as probabilities.
Definition 1. The partial allocation (PA) mechanism
on values v works as follows:
1. Compute the doubly-stochastic matrix pNSW(v) that
maximizes the Nash social welfare.
2. For each agent i, compute fi as follows:
(a) Let uk be agent k’s utility in p
NSW(v).
(b) Let u′k be agent k’s utility in p
NSW(v−i), i.e.,
in the NSW maximizing allocation with agent
i absent and all other agents restricted to one
unit, i.e.,
∑
j p
NSW
k,j (v−i) = 1 for all k 6= i.
(c) Let fi =
∏
k 6=i uk
/∏
k 6=i u
′
k.
3. Allocate each item j to each agent i with probability
qi,j = fi p
NSW
i,j (v).
Note that the fraction fi of the NSW maximizing
assignment allocated to agent i is equal to the relative
loss in utility that i’s presence imposes on the other
agents. The denominator is independent of i’s declared
valuations, so, in maximizing fi · ui, which would be
agent i’s goal, she is maximizing the NSW when she
reports truthfully. Cole et al. (2013) show that fi ∈
(1/e, 1], without the unit constraint on allocations, but
the same argument holds with the unit constraint.
Theorem 2.1. (Cole et al., 2013) The partial allo-
cation mechanism is truthful, feasible, and allocates each
agent i at fraction fi of the NSW maximizing assign-
ment, where fi is at least 1/e.
3 The Nash Bargaining Benchmark
In this section, we define our cardinal benchmark as
well as an approximation measure for evaluating mech-
anisms for the one-sided matching problem. Our bench-
mark is the Nash bargaining solution with a uniformly
random matching as the disagreement point. Each
agent i’s expected utility for this disagreement point is
oi =
1
n
∑
j vi,j and the Nash bargaining solution is the
outcome p∗ that maximizes the Nash Social Welfare ob-
jective with respect to the marginal valuations v−o. In
other words, the Nash bargaining solution distributes
the additional value, beyond each agent’s outside op-
tion, in a fair and efficient manner.
Definition 2. The Nash bargaining solution with dis-
agreement point (oi)i∈N is
p∗ = argmaxp
{∏
i
(∑
j
vi,j pi,j − oi
)}
,
where every agent i is constrained to have non-negative
utility
∑
j vi,jpi,j − oi ≥ 0.
Apart from its fairness properties, this benchmark
is also appealing because of its invariance to additive
shifts and multiplicative scalings of any agent’s values
for the items. Shifting all the values of an agent
by adding some constant does not affect the marginal
values after the outside option is subtracted. Also,
scaling all of the values of an agent by some constant
does not have any impact on what the Nash bargaining
solution, p∗, is; the product value of every outcome
is multiplied by the same constant, and hence the
optimum is unaffected. As a result, we do not need
to assume that the values reported by the agents are
scaled in any particular way. One thing to note about
the benchmark being invariant to these changes is that,
on instances where the agents’ values are identical up
to shifts and scales, the benchmark assignment is the
uniform random assignment.2
2The combined property of shift and scale invariance has
some counterintuitive implications. Consider an example instance
where all agents i have value vi,1 > 1 for item 1, and vi,j = 1 for
all other items j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. In the Nash bargaining solution,
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Our goal is to approximate p∗, the Nash bargaining
solution with disagreement point (oi)i∈N , using the
following per-agent approximation measure.
Definition 3. The per-agent approximation of mecha-
nism p with respect to benchmark assignment p∗ is the
worst-case ratio of the utility of any agent in p∗ and p,
max
v
{
max
i
{∑
j vi,jp
∗
i,j(v)∑
j vi,jpi,j(v)
}}
.
4 Inapproximability by Ordinal Mechanisms
Ordinal mechanisms are popular in the literature on
matching. Rather than asking agents for cardinal values
for each item, an ordinal mechanism need only solicit an
agent’s preference order over the items. Two prevalent
ordinal mechanisms are the random serial dictatorship
(RSD) and probabilistic serial (PS) mechanisms. One of
our main motivations for studying cardinal mechanisms
in this paper is that ordinal mechanisms are bound to
generate unfair allocations for some instances, due to
the fact that they disregard the intensity of the agents’
preferences; even when the agents agree, or partially
agree, on their preference order, they may still disagree
on preference intensities. A mechanism that does not
take these intensities into consideration is, for example,
unable to distinguish between agents whose favorite
item is very strongly preferred over the rest, and agents
who have only a slight preference for their top item over
the rest.
Our first lower bound shows that the random serial
dictatorship mechanism can be very unfair to some
agent, leading to an approximation factor as bad as n
(the number of agents).
Lemma 4.1. The worst case approximation ratio of
the random serial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism with
respect to the Nash bargaining benchmark is n.
Proof. Consider the example where agent 1 has value 1
for item 1 and no value for any other item, and each
agent i ≥ 2 has value 1 for item 1, value 1 − ǫ for item
i, and no value for other items:
v =


1 0 0 . . . 0
1 1− ǫ 0 . . . 0
1 0 1− ǫ . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 1− ǫ

 .
all agents receive a uniform random item and in particular a
1/n fraction of the preferred item 1. This outcome may seem
surprising as it does not account for the possibility that some
agents may prefer item 1 much more than other agents. This
uniform outcome results because the agents’ preferences are
equivalent up to additive and multiplicative shifts.
In RSD an ordering of the agents is generated uniformly
at random, and then each agent is allocated her favorite
available item in that order. In this instance, the first
agent in the random ordering will always select item 1,
and every agent has the same probability, 1/n, of being
ordered first. Since agent 1 has no value for any other
item, the expected utility of this agent 1 in RSD is 1/n.
On the other hand, as ǫ approaches zero, the Nash
bargaining solution assigns each agent i to item i with
probability that approaches 1. To verify this fact, note
that for ǫ = 0 the Nash bargaining would assign agent
i to item i with probability 1, and observe that the
distribution that RSD outputs is continuous in ǫ. Thus,
the utility of each agent in the Nash bargaining solution
– and specifically of agent 1 – approaches 1. As a result,
the RSD mechanism is being unfair to agent 1, leading
to an approximation factor of n.
In fact, with a small modification of the instance
used to verify how unfair the RSD mechanism can
be, the following theorem shows that every ordinal
mechanism is susceptible to this issue.
Theorem 4.1. The worst case approximation ratio of
any ordinal mechanism to the Nash bargaining bench-
mark is at least n− 1.
Proof. Consider the following instance v, where agents
correspond to rows and items to columns:
v =


1 ǫ 0 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 1− ǫ 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 0 1− ǫ . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 0 0 0 . . . 1− ǫ 0
1 0 0 0 . . . 0 1− ǫ
0 1 1 1 . . . 1 1


.
A key property of this instance is that the top n − 1
agents are ordinally indistinguishable. Each of them
ranks item 1 first, one of items {2, . . . , n} second, and
all other items last. On the other hand, each item
j ∈ {2, . . . , n} is ordinally indistinguishable. Each is
ranked second by exactly one of the top n − 1 agents
and ranked equivalently by agent n.
Fix an ordinal mechanism. The ordinal indistin-
guishablity of agents {1, . . . , n−1} implies, without loss
of generality up to agent relabeling, that agent 1 receives
item 1 with probability at most 1/(n− 1). Thus, in the
limit of ǫ going to 0, agent 1 obtains a utility of 1/(n−1)
in this ordinal mechanism.
The Nash bargaining solution is continuous in ǫ and
with ǫ = 0 it gives each agent the maximum utility of 1
by allocating item 1 to agent 1, item 2 to agent n, and
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item i + 1 to agent i for i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, in
the limit, as ǫ goes to zero the Nash bargaining solution
gives agent 1 a utility of 1. Therefore, the per-agent
approximation of any ordinal mechanism with respect
to the Nash bargaining benchmark is n− 1.
5 Randomized Partial Improvement
In this section, we define the random partial improve-
ment matching mechanism. This mechanism truthfully
elicits the agents’ cardinal preferences and uses them in
a non-trivial manner to select an outcome. We prove
that the per-agent approximation of this mechanism
with respect to the Nash bargaining benchmark is pro-
portional to the population monotonicity of the bench-
mark and its worst-case approximation is significantly
better than that of any ordinal mechanism. The ap-
proach of the mechanism is to run the PA mechanism
with the outside option given by the uniform random
assignment on a large sample of the agents and a large
fraction of the supply. The resulting mechanism inherits
the truthfulness of the PA mechanism.
There are two key difficulties with this approach.
First, in order to faithfully implement the outside
option, some of the supply needs to be kept aside in the
same proportion as the original supply. To enable this
set aside, we need to reduce the allocation consumed by
the PA mechanism; we achieve this with a novel use of
random sampling (cf. Goldberg et al., 2006). Second,
it is non-trivial to compare an agent’s utility across
Nash social welfare maximizing assignments for the
original market and a sample of the market. A major
endeavor of our analysis shows that per-agent utility is
approximately monotone, i.e., the fraction of an agent’s
utility that is lost as the competition from other agents
decreases is non-trivially bounded. (Note, competition
from other agents decreases as they are removed from
the market.) Our mechanism, then, is structured to
take advantage of this approximate monotonicity.
The mechanism is defined by a sequence of steps
that gradually construct a doubly-stochastic matrix. By
the Birkhoff von Neumann theorem, this matrix cor-
responds to a probability distribution over matchings.
The high-level steps and intuition are as follows: the
mechanism samples half the agents and runs at half scale
(i.e., with half-unit-demand agents and half-unit-supply
items) the PA mechanism with the outside option given
by the uniform random assignment. The total demand
of half the agents (roughly n/2) with half-unit demand
is a quarter of the total supply (roughly n/4), so there
is a leftover n/4 of supply from the half-units on which
the PA mechanism was run. A further one-quarter of
each of the n units is used to provide a half-unit of the
outside option to each of the (roughly) n/2 agents in the
sample. The final quarter is used to replace as necessary
the fractions of items withheld due to the fractional re-
duction in the PA mechanism. Necessarily, the one-unit
allocation to these agents uses up half the supply. The
remaining half of the supply is then allocated recursively
to the remaining half of the agents.
A formal description of this mechanism is below.
Since we call this mechanism recursively after some
agents’ allocation has been finalized (in the form of
marginal probabilities) and some portions of the items
have been allocated, we define it for the remaining n¯ ≤ n
agents and the original n items whose capacities may
have been reduced from 1 to (ci)i∈M ∈ [0, 1]n.
Definition 4. Given some value n0 ∈ N, the random-
ized partial improvement (RPI) mechanism on n¯ ≤ n
agents and n items with supplies c1, . . . , cn such that∑n
j=1 cj = n¯ works as follows:
1. If n¯ < n0, allocate the remaining item capacities
uniformly at random, i.e., return pi,j = cj/n¯ for
each agent i and terminate. Otherwise, continue.
2. Randomly sample a subset N ′ of n′ = ⌈n¯/2⌉ agents.
3. On the sampled agents run the PA mechanism with
the outside option given by the uniform random
assignment o′i =
1
n¯
∑n
j=1 vi,jcj from the supplies.
Denote the allocation of item j to agent i by q′i,j ; the
total amount allocated to agent i is f ′i =
∑n
j=1 q
′
i,j.
4. Allocate to each i ∈ N ′ half of their PA assignment
and “pad” it with the outside option to ensure a
unit allocation. As a result, the total allocation of
item j to agent i is p′i,j = q
′
i,j/2 + (1− f ′i/2) cj/n¯.
5. Recursively run RPI on the remaining n′′ = n¯− n′
agents and item supplies c′′j = cj −
∑
i∈N ′ p
′
i,j.
6. Return the assignment p that combines the assign-
ment p′ for N ′ and the assignment p′′ returned by
the recursive call for the remaining n′′ agents.
The following proof of correctness (feasibility and
truthfulness) formalizes the intuition preceding the def-
inition of the mechanism. The ideas of the proof are
more transparent in the case where n¯ is even and, in
particular, ⌈n¯/2⌉ = ⌊n¯/2⌋ = n¯/2.
Theorem 5.1. The randomized partial improvement
mechanism with n0 ≥ 4 on n unit-demand agents and
n unit-supply items is feasible, i.e., it gives fractional
allocations that produce a doubly stochastic matrix, and
truthful, i.e., it is a dominant strategy for each agent to
truthfully report her value for each item.
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Proof. Feasibility is proved by induction on the recur-
sive definition of the mechanism. The inductive hypoth-
esis is that the fractional allocation on n¯ agents with
supplies c1, . . . , cn such that
∑
j cj = n¯ has a total frac-
tional allocation to each agent of one, i.e.,
∑
j pi,j = 1
for each i, and a total fractional allocation of each item
equal to its supply, i.e.,
∑
i pi,j = cj for each j. The
base case of n¯ < n0 clearly satisfies the inductive hy-
pothesis. For the inductive step, the key point to argue
is that the supply cj of each item j is sufficient to cover
the allocation to the sampled agents.
This can be seen as follows. The ⌈n¯/2⌉ sampled
agents are allocated half of their PA assignment on
the supplied capacities. Since f ′i ≥ 1e for all i by
Theorem 2.1, this means that the amount of each
agent’s half PA assignment is
∑
j q
′
i,j/2 = f
′
i/2 ≥
1/(2e). To ensure that each agent gets exactly one
item in expectation, Step 4 pads this allocation with a
uniformly random assignment, which may thus require
up to 1 − 1/(2e) units for each of the ⌈n¯/2⌉ sampled
agents, for a total of (1 − 1/(2e))⌈n¯/2⌉. But, since the
full PA assignment allocated no more than cj of each
item j, the half PA assignment set aside at least cj/2
of each item, leading to a total of
∑
j cj/2 = n¯/2. We
conclude by observing that (1− 1/(2e))⌈n¯/2⌉ is at most
n¯/2 when n¯ ≥ n0 = 4, so the amount set aside from each
item is sufficient to cover the sampled agents’ allocation.
Truthfulness follows by considering each agent con-
ditioned on the state of the mechanism during the recur-
sive step where that agent is selected in the sampled set
N ′. The agent’s report plays no role in determining the
state at this point. Given the state, the outcome for this
agent is fully determined by the PA mechanism which
is truthful. Thus, the mechanism is truthful.
To bound the per-agent utility of the RPI mecha-
nism, we analyze the contribution to the utility of an
agent who is sampled in the outermost recursive call of
the mechanism. An agent is sampled as such with prob-
ability at least one half, and otherwise the agent’s util-
ity is at least zero. The utility of these sampled agents
is easily compared to the utility of the PA mechanism
(without the agents that are not sampled). An issue
significantly complicating the analysis of the approxi-
mation is the fact that we need to compare the utility
of an agent sampled in this invocation of the PA mech-
anism with their utility in the Nash bargaining solution
on the full set of agents. Counterintuitively, it is not
true that these agents are always better off without the
competition from the agents that are not sampled: there
are instances where removing some of the competition,
in fact, lowers the utility of an agent.
In Section 6 we define the ρ-utility monotonicity for
NSW to be the maximum non-monotonicity of utility of
any agent and sets of agentsN and subsetN ′ with NSW
maximizing solutions p and p′ respectively:
ρ := max
N ′⊆N
{
max
i∈N ′
{∑
j vi,jpi,j∑
j vi,jp
′
i,j
}}
.
This parameter quantifies the extent to which some
agent may be worse off in the NSW maximizing solution
after the removal of some subset of agents. Defining
the worst-case value of ρ across instances and subsets
as ρ∗, Section 6 bounds ρ∗ between Ω(2
√
log n/2) and
O(22
√
logn), the latter of which is o(nǫ) for any constant
ǫ > 0. It is worth noting that we ran experiments on
a large set of instances and found that this value was
actually no more than 1 in all of these instances.
Theorem 5.2. The randomized partial improvement
mechanism with n0 = 4 on n unit-demand agents and n
unit-supply items is a 4 e ρ approximation to the Nash
bargaining solution with disagreement point given by the
uniform random assignment.
Proof. If n < n0 = 4 then the base case of RPI is
invoked and a uniform assignment is returned. With
n < 4, however, this assignment is a 3 < 4 e ρ
approximation, as each agent obtains 1/3 of each item.
Otherwise, we analyze the contribution to the util-
ity of an agent conditioned on the agent being sampled
in the first recursive call of the algorithm. This event
happens with probability at least 1/2. When this hap-
pens the utility of the agent is half the utility of PA on
the sampled agents plus half the utility from the out-
side option. The ρ-utility monotonicity property implies
that the utility of an agent in the NSW maximizing out-
come on the sample is a ρ approximation to the same
agent’s utility in the NSW maximizing outcome on the
full set of agents. Running PA guarantees an e frac-
tion of this utility. Combining these steps and the fact
that agents who are not sampled in the first recursive
call still receive nonnegative utility, we obtain a 4 e ρ
approximation.
Combined with Theorem 6.1 from Section 6 which
bounds ρ∗ by O(22
√
logn), we have the following.
Corollary 5. The randomized partial improvement
mechanism with n0 = 4 on n unit-demand agents and
n unit-supply items guarantees an approximation of the
Nash bargaining solution with uniform outside option
with a factor O(22
√
log n) ⊆ o(nǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
6 Approximate Utility Monotonicity
A factor significantly complicating the analysis of the
approximation of the random partial improvement
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mechanism is the fact that the benchmark is computed
based on the Nash social welfare maximizing solution
when all agents in N are present, while the mecha-
nism’s performance depends on the solution for N ′, the
sampled agents. The NSW maximizing solution for N
and N ′ can generally be quite different. Moreover, as
it turns out, there are instances where the utilities of
some agents in the NSW maximizing solution are non-
monotone with respect to removal of other agents, i.e.,
there exist instances that exhibit positive externalities
between agents. Table 1 gives a simple example of such
an instance (discussed in detail later on) and the remain-
der of the section develops upper and lower bounds on
the worst-case non-monotonicity of utility.
Definition 6. A matching environment on agents N
is ρ-utility monotone if for any subset N ′ of N and
any i ∈ N ′ the utility of i in the NSW maximizing
assignment, p′, for N ′ is at least a ρ approximation to
the NSW maximizing assignment, p, for N :
ρ := max
N ′⊆N
{
max
i∈N ′
{∑
j vi,jpi,j∑
j vi,jp
′
i,j
}}
.
This parameter quantifies the extent to which some
agent may be worse off in the NSW solution after
the removal of some subset of agents. We let ρ∗,
denote the worst case value of ρ across instances;
this value is known as the opportunity structure of
the Nash bargaining solution for this class of in-
stances (Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). In Section 6.1
we prove an upper bound of O(22
√
logn), which is o(nǫ)
for any constant ǫ > 0, for the value of ρ∗ over all
one-sided matching instances, and in Section 6.2 we
complement this result by proving a lower bound of
Ω(2
√
logn/2) for this value.
6.1 Upper Bound. Given a valuation matrix v and
a random matching p, we henceforth use ui(p) to
denote the expected utility of agent i for p given v,
i.e.,
∑
j∈M vi,jpi,j (similarly, we use u
′
i(p) for valuation
matrix v′). Note that, as we discussed in Section 3, the
Nash bargaining solution is scale invariant. Therefore,
if we scale the valuations of each agent i by some
constant ci > 0, then the Nash bargaining solution with
respect to valuations civi,j instead of vi,j will remain the
same. This means that given some problem instance
that yields a doubly stochastic matrix p as its Nash
bargaining solution, we can always “normalize” the
valuations of the agents so that every agent’s expected
utility for p is equal to 1, and p remains that Nash
bargaining solution of the normalized instance. This is
a convenient normalization that we make use of below.
In order to prove the upper bound on ρ∗, we first
prove the following very useful lemmata.
Lemma 6.1. Let p be a NSW maximizing solution, and
v be the valuations normalized so that for every agent
i, ui(p) = 1. Then, if some agent i is allocated an item
j with positive probability, i.e., pi,j > 0, every other
agent k 6= i must have vk,j ≤ vi,j + 1. Equivalently,
vi,j ≥ maxk∈N{vk,j} − 1.
Proof. For contradiction, assume that there exist two
agents k and i and an item j such that pi,j > 0 and
vk,j = vi,j + 1 + δ for some δ > 0. Since the expected
utility of agent k is 1, there must also exist some item
ℓ with pk,ℓ > 0 and vk,ℓ ≤ 1 (otherwise the expected
utility of agent k would be greater than 1). Note that
ℓ 6= j, since vk,j = vi,j + 1 + δ > 1, whereas vk,ℓ ≤ 1.
Let p′ be a probability distribution identical to p,
except p′k,j = pk,j + ǫ, p
′
i,j = pi,j − ǫ, p′k,ℓ = pk,ℓ − ǫ,
and p′i,ℓ = pi,ℓ + ǫ, for some positive ǫ < min{pi,j , pk,ℓ},
whose exact value we choose later on. In other words,
p′ swaps probability ǫ between agents i, k and items j, ℓ.
The expected utility of agent k in p′ is
uk(p
′) = 1 + ǫvk,j − ǫvk,ℓ
≥ 1 + ǫ(vi,j + 1 + δ)− ǫ
= 1 + ǫvi,j + ǫδ,
and the expected utility of agent i in p′ is
ui(p
′) = 1 + ǫvi,ℓ − ǫvi,j
≥ 1− ǫvi,j .
Since every other agent’s expected utility is the same in
p′ and p (equal to 1), the NSW of p′ is∏
i∈N
ui(p
′) ≥ (1 + ǫvi,j + ǫδ)(1− ǫvi,j)
= 1 + ǫ(δ − ǫ(v2i,j + δvi,j)).
Therefore, if we let ǫ < δ/(v2i,j + δvi,j)), the NSW of p
′
is greater than 1, which is the NSW of p, contradicting
the fact that p is a NSW maximizing solution.
Lemma 6.2. Given a problem instance, let p and p be
the NSW maximizing outcomes before and after (respec-
tively) some subset of the agents has been removed. If
among the remaining agents there exists a set of agents
N1 and a constant d ≥ 12 such that every agent i ∈ N1
has ui(p) ≤ ui(p)/d, then there also exists a larger set
N2 of remaining agents such that |N2| ≥ d|N1|/3 and
for all agents k ∈ N2 we have uk(p) ≤ 4uk(p)/d.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let v be the agent
valuations normalized so that ui(p) = 1 for every agent
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A B C A B C A B C
a 1 2 0 1 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
b 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1/2 1/2
c 0 0 1 0 0 1
i. Agent valuations ii. Initial solution iii. Final solution
Table 1: A simple instance involving three agents; a, b, c; and three items; A,B,C. The value of agent b in the
Nash bargaining solution after the removal of agent c drops by a factor of 4/3. The optimality of solutions (ii) and
(iii) for Nash social welfare are intuitive; however, formal justification is given in Section 6.2 where this example
is revisited.
i, and v′ be the valuations normalized so that u′i(p) = 1.
Given the vi,j values that yield ui(p) = 1, we can get
the v′i,j values that yield u
′
i(p) = 1 using the simple
formula v′i,j = vi,j · ui(p)ui(p) . In other words, for each agent
i who is worse-off in p compared to p, i.e., ui(p) < ui(p),
we scale all of that agent’s item values up by the same
factor, ui(p)/ui(p). In particular, for each agent i ∈ N1
this means that v′i,j ≥ dvi,j for every item j.
For every i ∈ N1 we know that the drop in that
agent’s value with respect to the original valuations
is ui(p) − ui(p) ≥ ui(p)(1 − 1/d) = 1 − 1/d. In
order to account for that drop, we partition the set
of items of which i is allocated more in p compared
to p into two sets depending on whether vi,j ≥ 0.5 or
not: Mhi = {j ∈ M : pi,j > pi,j and vi,j ≥ 0.5} and
M ℓi = {j ∈ M : pi,j > pi,j and vi,j < 0.5}. We first
show that from the aforementioned 1−1/d drop in value,
no more than 0.5 could be due to the items inM ℓi , since
∑
j∈Mℓi
(pi,j − pi,j)vi,j < 0.5
∑
j∈Mℓi
(pi,j − pi,j) ≤ 0.5.
Therefore, at least 0.5 − 1/d of this drop in value for
each agent i ∈ N1 is due to items in Mhi . Summing this
up over all the agents in N1, we get
∑
i∈N1
∑
j∈Mhi
(pi,j − pi,j)vi,j ≥
∑
i∈N1
(
0.5− 1
d
)
(6.1)
= |N1|
(
0.5− 1
d
)
.(6.2)
Let N2 = {k ∈ N : pk,j > 0 for some j ∈⋃
i∈N1 M
h
i } be the set of agents that are allocated with
positive probability in p an item from Mhi for some
i ∈ N1. Using Lemma 6.1 we get that for every
item j ∈ Mhi , if pk,j > 0 then vk,j ≤ vi,j + 1 and
v′k,j ≥ v′i,j − 1. Using the fact that v′i,j ≥ dvi,j for
every i ∈ N1, shown above, the latter inequality also
implies that v′k,j ≥ dvi,j − 1. Therefore
v′k,j
vk,j
≥ dvi,j − 1
vi,j + 1
≥ d− d+ 1
1.5
≥ d
4
,
where the second inequality uses the fact that vi,j ≥ 0.5
and the last inequality uses the fact that d ≥ 8. This
implies that for every k ∈ N2
uk(p) =
∑
j∈M
pk,jvk,j
≤
∑
j∈M
pk,j
4
d
v′k,j
=
4
d
∑
j∈M
pk,jv
′
k,j
=
4u′k(p)
d
=
4uk(p)
d
,
where the last equation uses the fact that u′k(p) =
uk(p) = 1 according to our normalization.
Since we have shown that for all k ∈ N2 we have
uk(p) ≤ 4uk(p)/d, it now suffices to show that the
size of N2 is at least d|N1|/3. Since, for any item
j ∈ ⋃i∈N1 Mhi , any agent k with pi,j > 0 satisfies v′k,j ≥
dvi,j − 1, the total value, with respect to valuations v′,
generated by the item fractions of the items “lost” by
the agents in N1 is at least∑
i∈N1
∑
j∈Mhi
(pi,j − pi,j)(dvi,j − 1)
≥ d|N1|
(
0.5− 1
d
)
−
∑
i∈N1
∑
j∈Mhi
(pi,j − pi,j)
≥ d|N1|
(
0.5− 1
d
)
− |N1|
≥ d− 4
2
|N1|
≥ d
3
|N1|,
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where the last inequality uses the fact that d ≥ 12. But,
since the total value of each agent in N2 with respect to
valuations v′ is exactly 1, there need to be at least d3 |N1|
agents in N2 sharing this value, otherwise there would
exist some agent i ∈ N2 such that u′i(p) > 1.
Theorem 6.1. For any problem instance, the value of
ρ is O(22
√
logn) ⊆ o(nǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
Proof. In order to prove this bound, we will repeatedly
apply the result of Lemma 6.2. Let p and p be the NSW
maximizing outcomes in a problem instance before and
after some subset of the agents has been removed and,
without loss of generality, let v be the agent valuations
normalized so that ui(p) = 1 for every agent i, and v
′
be the valuations normalized so that u′i(p) = 1.
By Definition 6, in an instance with utility mono-
tonicity equal to ρ, there exists at least one agent
i ∈ N1 such that ui(p)/ui(p) = ρ or ui(p) = ui(p)/ρ.
If ρ > 12, then Lemma 6.2 would imply that there
also exists a set N2 of at least ρ/3 agents such that
uk(p) ≤ 4uk(p)/ρ = 4/ρ for every k ∈ N2. Lemma 6.2,
combined with the existence of the set N2, in turn, im-
plies the existence of an even larger group N3 of at
least (13ρ) · (13ρ/4) agents, and each agent k ∈ N3 has
value uk(p) ≤ 16/ρ. Applying Lemma 6.2 a total of
α times thus implies the existence of a set of at least
(ρ/3)α ·(1/4)α(α−1)/2 agents such that each such agent k
has value uk(p) ≤ 4α/ρ. Assume that there exists some
instance for which ρ is at least 4
√
logn+1. If we choose
α =
√
logn, however, this implies the existence of
(ρ/3)α · (1/4α(α−1)/2) ≥ 4(
√
logn+1)·√log n/[(3/2)
√
logn ·
2
√
logn·√log n] ≥ (8/3)
√
logn · n ≥ n agents of value at
most 4α/ρ ≤ 1/4. But, this would imply that all the
agents have a value less than 1 in p, which contradicts
the fact that p is a NSW maximizing solution because
the product in p is equal to 1.
6.2 Lower Bound. We conclude with a lower bound
showing that for a very carefully designed (and some-
what artificial) family of instances, the upper bound of
Theorem 6.1 is essentially tight.
Theorem 6.2. There exists a family of problem in-
stances for which ρ∗ = Ω(2
√
log n/2).
Due to space limitations and the complexity of
the construction that yields Theorem 6.2, we defer its
description to Appendix A. To exhibit how we use KKT
conditions to prove that this elaborate construction
implies the desired bound, we use the rest of this section
to apply this approach to the much simpler construction
of the example in Table 1, which yields a bound of
ρ∗ ≥ 4/3.
Our lower bound construction in the appendix pro-
ceeds by building a family of instances (parameterized
by the number of agents n), and in each instance, we de-
fine an “initial” setting in which all agents are present,
and a “final” setting, in which some agents have been
removed. For each setting, we identify the Nash bar-
gaining solution, respectively called the initial and final
solution. We focus on a particular agent, called the
loser, who is present in both settings. We show that
the loser’s valuation drops by a multiplicative factor µ
in going from the initial to the final solution, and conse-
quently, ρ ≥ 1/µ for that market and ρ∗ ≥ 1/µ overall.
To prove a lower bound, we need to be able to verify
that a given doubly stochastic matrix is indeed the Nash
bargaining solution of the instance at hand. We do so
using the KKT conditions, which allow us to interpret
these solutions as a form of market equilibrium. The
optimization problem which yields the Nash bargaining
solution in one-sided matching markets, is shown below
(where m = n is used to denote the number of items):
max
n∑
i=1
log

 n∑
j=1
vi,jpi,j


such that: for all i :
m∑
j=1
pi,j ≤ 1
for all j :
n∑
i=1
pi,j ≤ 1
for all i, j : pi,j ≥ 0.
If tj is the dual variable related to each item j, and
qi is the dual variable related to each agent i in the
above program, then the KKT conditions state that:
for all j : tj ≥ 0, and tj > 0 =⇒
n∑
i=1
pi,j = 1(6.3)
for all i : qi ≥ 0 and qi > 0 =⇒
m∑
j=1
pi,j = 1(6.4)
for all i, j :
vi,j
tj + qi
≤
m∑
j=1
vi,jpi,j and
pi,j > 0 =⇒ vi,j
tj + qi
=
m∑
j=1
vi,jpi,j
(6.5)
The KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient
for the optimal solution when the constraints are linear
and the objective is convex, as is the case here. To
check whether a given candidate solution p is a Nash
bargaining solution for some instance, we first normalize
the valuations so that
∑m
j=1 vi,jpi,j = 1 for all i. Then,
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at a solution satisfying the KKT conditions we have
vi,j = tj + qi if pi,j > 0 and vi,j ≤ tj + qi if pi,j = 0.
Thus a solution that satisfies these two conditions plus
conditions (6.3)–(6.4) is a Nash bargaining solution.
Based on this conditions, the values of tj can be
interpreted as item-specific “prices” and the values of qi
as agent-specific “prices”, leading to an interpretation
of the Nash bargaining solution as a market equilibrium:
to “buy” a pi,j fraction of item j, agent i needs to spend
(tj + qi)pi,j , and each agent prefers to buy only items
with the best value over price ratio (see condition (6.5)).
To illustrate the usefulness of these variables, which
are used extensively in the appendix, we revisit the
instance of Table 1 where the items are named A, B, and
C; the bidders a, b, and c; and the unscaled valuations
of the agents appear in Table 2(i).
First, we observe that in the initial equilibrium
(with all agents present), a, b, c receive items A,B,C,
respectively, each with probability 1. In Table 2(ii)
we show the normalized values of the agents in this
equilibrium and we also provide the dual variables tj
for each item j and qi for each agent i. It is easy
to verify that the aforementioned KKT conditions are
satisfied in this case and hence this is indeed the Nash
bargaining solution when all agents are present. If agent
c is removed, then the final equilibrium finds a receiving
each of A and B with probability 12 , while b receiving
each of B and C with probability 12 . Table 2(iii)
provides the scaled valuations and dual variable values
for this outcome, and it is again easy to verify that KKT
conditions are satisfied. In this example, bidder b is the
loser. Using the valuations from Table 2(ii), her value
in the initial equilibrium was 1 and it dropped to 0.75 in
the final equilibrium, leading to ρ = 43 in this example.
7 Further Related Work
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) study the problem of
matching with cardinal preferences and the solution
of competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI).
CEEI gives both a natural cardinal notion of efficiency
and of fairness. Recently, Alaei et al. (2017) give a
polynomial time algorithm for computing the CEEI in
matching markets when there are a constant number of
distinct agent preferences. To our knowledge, the com-
plexity of computing CEEI in general matching prob-
lems is unknown. With linear preferences, but without
the unit-demand constraint, CEEI and Nash social wel-
fare coincide and can be computed in polynomial time.
Devanur and Kannan (2008) generalize this computa-
tional result to piecewise linear concave utilities when
the number of goods is constant.
Recently, Budish (2011) considers the generaliza-
tion from matching to a combinatorial assignment prob-
lem where agents may have non-linear preferences over
bundles of goods, and shows that an approximate ver-
sion of CEEI exists. This work also shows that, in large
markets, the mechanism that outputs this approximate
CEEI is asymptotically truthful. Heuristics for com-
puting the CEEI outcome are given by Othman et al.
(2010) and these heuristics have been deployed for the
course assignment problem by Budish et al. (2016). On
the other hand, Othman et al. (2016) show that the
computation of CEEI in these combinatorial assignment
problems is PPAD-hard.
The Nash social welfare objective of our work com-
pares to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes of
the aforementioned works as follows: the two objectives
coincide for linear preferences without the matching
constraint (Vazirani, 2007), but with the matching con-
straint the concepts are not equivalent. Both NSW and
CEEI outcomes are Pareto efficient, but to our knowl-
edge, in matching markets, the agents’ utilities under
the two criteria have not been directly compared. Con-
trasting with CEEI, for stochastic matchings, the NSW
outcomes can be calculated by a convex program, i.e.,
a program that optimizes the product of utilities over
the marginal probabilities given by a doubly-stochastic
matrix, and is therefore computationally tractable.
A second line of literature considers ordinal mech-
anisms for one-sided matching. The random se-
rial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism has a long his-
tory of practical application. Recently it has been
used in applications such as housing and course allo-
cation. Pathak and Sethuraman (2011) study the use
of RSD for school choice in New York City. RSD
is truthful, ex post Pareto efficient, and easy to im-
plement (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998). On
the other hand, RSD is neither ex ante Pareto effi-
cient nor envy-free. To remedy this deficiency of RSD,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) developed the proba-
bilistic serial (PS) mechanism which, while not truth-
ful, is ordinally efficient, envy-free, and easy to im-
plement. PS has been studied in various contexts
ranging from school assignments to kidney matching
and it is often contrasted with RSD. For example,
Pathak and Sethuraman (2011) show that students of-
ten obtain a more desirable random assignment from PS
than from RSD. Nonetheless, under a large market as-
sumption PS and RSD converge and the desirable prop-
erties of both are attained (Kojima and Manea, 2010;
Che and Kojima, 2010). More recent work has also fur-
ther studied and compared the performance of these two
mechanisms with respect to different metrics both the-
oretically and experimentally (e.g., Aziz et al. (2016);
Hosseini et al. (2018)).
Several recent papers have considered approxima-
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A B C A B C q A B C q
a 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2/3 4/3 0 0
b 0 2 1 0 1 1/2 0 0 4/3 2/3 0
c 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
t 0 1 1 t 2/3 4/3 2/3
i. Agent valuations ii. Initial solution iii. Final solution
Table 2: Simple instance involving three agents; a, b, c; and three items; A,B,C. The value of agent b in the Nash
bargaining solution after the removal of agent c drops by a factor of 4/3. Normalized values are depicted in (ii)
and (iii) along with prices t and q; these values are depicted in bold-face if the allocation probability of the NSW
solution is non-zero.
tion in one-sided matching markets without money
when agents have cardinal preferences. With cardinal
preferences, it is possible to consider the aggregate wel-
fare of an allocation as the sum of the expected utilities
of each agent. For an aggregate notion of welfare to
make sense, the values of the agents need to be nor-
malized. Two common normalizations are unit-sum,
which scales each agent’s values so that their sum is
one, and unit-range, which scales and shifts each agent’s
values so that the minimum value is zero and the maxi-
mum value is one. Under either of these normalizations,
Filos-Ratsikas et al. (2014) show that randomized se-
rial dictatorship is an Θ(
√
n) approximation and that
no algorithm for mapping ordinal preferences to allo-
cations is asymptotically better. Christodoulou et al.
(2016) consider the unit-sum normalization and show
that the price of anarchy of PS is Θ(
√
n) and that no
mechanism, ordinal or cardinal, is asymptotically bet-
ter. Important comparison of these above results to ours
are as follows: our guarantees do not require a normal-
ization of values. Our approximation guarantees are on
per-agent utilities, not on the aggregate welfare which
allows some agents to be harmed if other agents bene-
fit. We show that our randomized partial improvement
mechanism is asymptotically better than RSD in our
per-agent analysis framework by a factor of Ω(
√
n).
More recently, Immorlica et al. (2017) use a notion
of approximate Pareto efficiency to analyze the raffles
mechanism in one-sided matching markets. This effi-
ciency measure provides per-agent approximation guar-
antees with respect to the Pareto frontier. Our approx-
imation measure can therefore be thought of as a re-
finement where instead we compare the agent utilities
to a specific highly desired point on the Pareto frontier
(the Nash bargaining solution). Instead of eliciting the
preferences of the agents, the raffles mechanism instead
provides the agents with tickets that they can allocate
to items, and items are distributed in proportion to the
allocated tickets. As a result, this mechanism is not
truthful, but the main result shows that its Nash equi-
libria are e/(e − 1)-approximately Pareto efficient, i.e.,
that there is no equilibrium where each agent’s utility
is increased by more than an e/(e− 1) factor.
Our mechanism is based on the partial allocation
(PA) mechanism of Cole et al. (2013) that truthfully
and approximately solves the fair division of heteroge-
neous goods. A novel feature of the PA mechanism is
that a fraction of the fair allocation is withheld from
individual agents in a way that behaves, in the agents’
utilities, as payments that align the incentives of the
agents with the Nash social welfare objective. The fair
division problem is closely tied to the cake-cutting lit-
erature, which originated in the social sciences but has
garnered interest from computer scientists and mathe-
maticians alike (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Moulin, 2003;
Robertson and Webb, 1998; Young, 1995). The cake –
a heterogeneous, divisible item – is represented by the
interval [0, 1] and the agents have valuation functions as-
signing each subinterval to a non-negative value. These
valuations are also assumed to be additive. Algorithmic
challenges in cake cutting have recently attracted the
attention of computer scientists. A historical overview
as well as notable results in cake cutting can be found in
surveys by Procaccia (2013) and Procaccia and Moulin
(2016). The cardinal matching problem we consider is
closely related to the cake cutting problem with piece-
wise uniform valuations since our agents have linear
preferences over items.
Random sampling techniques are now common in
the literature on mechanism design. They have been
primarily developed for revenue maximization prob-
lems where the seller lacks prior information on the
agents’ preferences (Hartline and Karlin, 2007). Our
use of random sampling more closely resembles the lit-
erature on redistribution mechanisms, where the de-
signer aims to maximize the consumer surplus and mon-
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etary transfers between agents are allowed (Cavallo,
2006; Guo and Conitzer, 2007). An approach by Moulin
(2009) is to single out a random agent as the residual
claimant, run an efficient mechanism on the remaining
agents, and pay the revenue generated by the mecha-
nism to the residual claimant. Similarly, our mechanism
randomly partitions the agents into two groups and at-
tempts to implement the PA mechanism on the first
group while using the items that would be reserved for
the second group to implement the first group’s outside
option. Further connections between our approach and
redistribution mechanisms may be possible.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We defined the random partial improvement (RPI)
mechanism for one-sided matching markets without
monetary transfers. RPI both truthfully elicits the car-
dinal preferences of the agents and outputs a distri-
bution over matchings that approximates every agent’s
utility in the Nash bargaining solution.
Our analysis suggests several open questions and
directions for future work. A natural open question
is whether there exists a truthful mechanism that can
achieve a constant factor approximation of the Nash
bargaining benchmark. The main obstacle for the
RPI mechanism was the non-monotonicity of the Nash
bargaining benchmark, so it would be interesting to
see if some other mechanism could circumvent this
issue. Alternatively, since the construction leading to
the lower bound is quite artificial, are there any natural
assumptions regarding the valuations of the agents that
would mitigate the non-monotonicity?
Another interesting direction would be to study how
the utilities of agents in the CEEI outcomes compare
to those of the Nash bargaining solution. Recall that
the CEEI and the Nash bargaining solution are equiva-
lent in linear markets without the matching constraint
(Vazirani, 2007), but are different for matching markets.
Finally, our paper provides a non-trivial mechanism
aiming to approximate a well-motivated ex-ante Pareto
efficient outcome. One could also consider the design of
truthful mechanisms aiming to approximate alternative
benchmarks on the ex-ante Pareto frontier. Natural
candidates would be the utilitarian (or the egalitarian)
outcome which maximize the sum (or the minimum) of
the agents’ utilities. One drawback of these outcomes is
that, unlike the Nash bargaining solution, they are not
scale invariant, but one could consider scaled variants
of their objectives, e.g., where the agent values are
normalized so that
∑
j∈M vi,j = 1 for every agent i.
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A The Lower Bound Construction
The construction uses a collection of overlapping sub-
markets named M0,M1, . . . ,Ms. Associated with these
markets are integer parameters kr, for 1 ≤ r ≤ s. There
will be kr copies of Mr in the construction. As we shall
see, ks = 1, thus there will be exactly one copy of Ms.
Next, in Figure 1 and Table 3, we show the form of
M0. The nodes in this figure correspond to the items,
and a directed edge (α, β), labeled by the name of an
agent, indicates that this agent was allocated portions
of item α in the initial solution and portions of β in the
final solution. Items and bidders occur with multiplicity
possibly greater than 1 and this is called their size. In
the initial equilibrium, every item is fully allocated as
the total size of the bidders and items are the same; in
the final equilibrium, item A0 is the one item that is
not fully allocated. Note that in each equilibrium, the
conditions (6.3)–(6.5) from Section 6.2 are satisfied.
We continue by presenting the constructions of
marketsMr, for 1 ≤ r < s and of marketMs in Tables 4
and 5, respectively. Ms is very similar to Mr; the only
difference lies in the presence of one additional item Is,
which is the item es, the losing bidder, will receive in
the final equilibrium, plus one additional bidder, is, who
leaves in the final setting. In these markets, all items
are fully allocated in both equilibria.
To complete the construction we have to show that
the various unspecified parameters can be chosen so that
the conditions of (6.5) are satisfied for every item-bidder
pair. (It is immediate that (6.3)–(6.4) are satisfied.)
Lemma A.1. There are choices of values for the un-
specified parameters for which the valuations specified
above yield the claimed initial and final equilibria.
Proof. We need to choose the values vIf,r, v
I
g,r, v
I
h,r,
vFf,r, v
F
g,r , v
F
h,r, the sizes kr, and the size proportionality
factors sa,r, sb,r, sc,r, sd,r, sf,r, sg,r, sh,r so that for
each buyer in each equilibrium, its average value is 1,
for 1 ≤ r ≤ s. First, we set sa,r = sb,r + sf,r + sc,r,
sc,r = sd,r + sg,r, and sb,r + sd,r = 1 + sh,r.
Next, we observe that because the buyer h0 = a1,
its values for H0 = A1 are the same, i.e. 2 =
8
9v1, or
v1 = 2 · 98 . Similarly, item Er = Ar+1, so vr+1 = 98vr.
We conclude that vr = 2 ·
(
9
8
)r
.
Now, for buyer br, we choose sb,r =
5
9sd,r, for
16
7 sb,rkr +
2
7sd,rkr
sb,rkr + sd,rkr
=
16
7 · 59 + 27
5
9 + 1
= 1.
Thus sd,r =
9
14 (1 + sh,r) and sb,r =
5
14 (1 + sh,r). To
ensure these values are integers, we will make sure that
1 + sh,r is an integer multiple of 14.
We turn to the values vFf,r, v
F
g,r, v
F
h,r. We choose
sh,r = 14⌊vr/14⌋+13, and vFh,r to satisfy vFh,rsh,r+vr =
sh,r + 1; i.e. v
F
h,r = (⌊vr⌋ + 1 − vr)/⌊vr⌋. We need to
confirm that vIh,r ≤ 97 ; but vIh,r = 9/(7vr) ·vFh,r < vFh,r <
1, as vr ≥ 94 .
Similarly, when vr >
9
2 , we set sg,r = ⌊ 29vr⌋sd,r
(for when vr ≤ 92 , this would set sg,r = 0), and
vFg,r = sg,r+
2
9vrsd,r = sg,r+sd,r; i.e. v
F
g,r = (⌊ 29vr⌋sd,r+
sd,r − 29vrsd,r)/⌊ 29vr⌋sd,r. Again, we need to confirm
that vIg,r ≤ 32 ; but vIg,r = 9/(4vr) · vFg,r ≤ vFg,r ≤ 1, as
vr >
9
2 .
When vr <
9
2 , we set sg,r = ⌈ 9−2vr2
3
vr−1⌉ and v
F
g,r =
(sg,r + sd,r − 29vrsd,r)/sg,r; but then sd,r = 9, so
vFg,r = 1 + (9 − 2vr)/⌈ 9−2vr2
3
vr−1⌉. Again, we need to
confirm that vIg,r ≤ 32 ; but vIg,r = 9/(4vr) · vFg,r ≤
9/(4vr)(1 +
2
3vr − 1) = 32 .
As vr = 2 ·
(
9
8
)r
, vr 6= 92 for any r.
Also, we set sf,r = ⌊ 169 vr⌋sb,r + ⌊ 49vr⌋sc,r and
vFf,rsf,r +
16
9 vrsb,r +
4
9vrsc,r = sf,r + sb,r + sc,r; i.e.
vFf,r = (⌊ 169 vr⌋sb,r + ⌊ 49vr⌋sc,r + sb,r + sc,r − (169 vrsb,r +
4
9vrsc,r))/(⌊ 169 vr⌋sb,r + ⌊ 49vr⌋sc,r).
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items A0, size 17,000
items B0, size 850
items C0, size 816 items D0, size 34
exit in final equil. items E0, size 33
exit in final equil.
items F0, size 1 items G0, size 5, alloc. to f0
items H0, size 1
a0
b0 b0
c0 d0
e0
d0
f0
h0 = a1
Figure 1: The Allocations in Market M0.
item A0 B0 C0 D0 E0 F0 G0 H0 = A1 q value
size 17,000 850 816 34 33 1 5 1
The initial equilibrium:
Bidder size 0
a0 17,000 1 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
b0 850 0 1
4687
7008 1.5 0 0 0 0 0.5
c0 816 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
d0 34 0 0 0 1 5/11 2 0 0 0
e0 33 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
f0 6 0 0 0 0 0
8
3
2
3
5
3
2
3
h0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
t value 0 0.5 1 1 1 2 0 1
The final equilibrium:
a0 17,000
40
41
60
41
0 0 0 0 0 0 4041
b0 850 0
292
205
4687
4920
438
205
0 0 0 0 192205
d0 34 0 0 0 2
10
11
4 0 0 45
f0 6 0 0 0 0 0
16
5
4
5
2 0
h0 = a1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
t value 0 2041
79
4920
6
5
6
55
16
5
4
5 2 = t
A,F
1
Table 3: Market M0, showing normalized valuations, multiplicity of bidders and items (their sizes), assignments
(in bold), and the t and q values, for both the initial and final equilibria. The overlap with Market M1 lies in
item H0 which is also item A1 and bidder h0 who is also bidder a1. Note that the t values for H0 = A1 are the
same in markets M0 and M1 in both equilibria, as are the q values for h0 = a1.
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items Ar, size sa,r
items Br, size sb,r items Fr , size sf,r
Buyers fr; exit in final equil.
items Cr , size sc,r
items Dr, size sd,r items Gr, size sg,r
Buyers gr; exit in final equil.
items Er = Ar+1, size 1 items Hr, size sh,r
Buyers hr; exit in final equil.
Buyers ar Buyers ar
Buyers br
Buyers cr
Buyers br
Figure 2: The Allocations in Market Mr, 1 ≤ r < s. The parameters are specified in the proof of Lemma A.1.
item Ar Br Cr Dr Er Fr Gr Hr q value
= Ar+1
size sa,r sb,r sc,r sd,r 1 sf,r sg,r sh,r
Initial equilibrium:
Bidder size
ar sa,r 1 2
1
2 0 0 v
I
f,r 0 0 0
br sb,r + sd,r 0
16
7
0 2
7
9
7 0 0 v
I
h,r
2
7
cr sc,r 0 0 1
1
2 0 0 v
I
g,r 0
1
2
fr sf,r 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
gr sg,r 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
hr sh,r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
t value 1 2 12 0 1 1 1 1
Final equilibrium:
ar sa,r
8
9
vr
16
9
vr
4
9
vr 0 0 v
F
f,r 0 0 0
br sb,r + sd,r 0
16
9 vr 0
2
9vr vr 0 0 v
F
h,r 0
cr sc,r 0 0
4
9vr
2
9
vr 0 0 v
F
g,r 0 0
t value 89vr
16
9 vr
4
9vr
2
9vr vr v
F
f,r v
F
g,r v
F
h,r
Table 4: Component Cr, showing normalized valuations, multiplicity of bidders and items (their sizes), and the t
and q values, for both the initial and final equilibria. va,Fr and v
c,F
r are normalizing factors, equal to the value of
the assignments using the initial valuations.
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items Es, size 1
items Is, size 1
Buyer is; exit in final equil.
Buyer es, the loser
Figure 3: The Allocations in Market Ms.
item Es Is q value
size 1 1
The initial equilibrium:
Bidder size
es 1 1 1/(vs + 1) 0
is 1 0 1 0
t value 1 1
The final equilibrium:
es 1 vs + 1 1 1
t value vs 0
Table 5: Component Cs, showing the additional portion
in addition to the part shown in Table 4.
We can now calculate the following values.
sh,r = 14⌊vr/14⌋+ 13
sd,r = 9(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1)
sb,r = 5(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1)
sg,r = 9⌊2vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) for vr > 9
2
sg,r = ⌈ 9− 2vr2
3vr − 1
⌉ for vr < 9
2
sc,r = 9(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) · (⌊2vr/9⌋+ 1) for vr > 9
2
sc,r = 9 + ⌈ 9− 2vr2
3vr − 1
⌉ for vr < 9
2
sf,r = 5⌊16vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1)
+ 9⌊4vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) · (⌊2vr/9⌋+ 1) for vr > 9
2
sf,r = 5⌊16vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) for vr < 9
2
sa,r = 5(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) + 9(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) · (⌊2vr/9⌋+ 1)
+ 5⌊16vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1)
+ 9⌊4vr/9⌋(⌊vr/14⌋+ 1) · (⌊2vr/9⌋+ 1) for vr > 9
2
sa,r = 14 + ⌈ 9− 2vr2
3vr − 1
⌉+ 5⌊16vr/9⌋ for vr < 9
2
.
We also set kr−1 = sa,rkr for 0 ≤ r < s, and create k0
copies of M0. Recall that ks = 1.
To conclude the lower bound analysis we lower
bound the size of s and hence of vs. We observe that for
vr >
9
2 , sa,r ≤ 5(vr/14+1)+9(vr/14+1) · (2vr/9+1)+
5 · 16vr/9(vr/14 + 1) + 4vr · (vr/14 + 1) · (2vr/9 + 1) ≤
4v3r/63+ 91v
2
r/63+ 143vr/9+ 14 ≤ 2v3r , as vr ≥ 92 , and
for vr <
9
2 , sa,r ≤ 14 + 9 + 80vr/9 ≤ 4v3r .
Note that vs = 2
(
9
8
)s
. We can conclude that
k0 ≤ 4v3s · 4
(
8
9
vs
)3
. . . 4
((
8
9
)s−1
vs
)3
= 4
(
2
(
9
8
)s)3
· 4
(
2
(
9
8
)s−1)3
. . . ·
(
2
(
9
8
))3
= (32)s
(
9
8
)s(s−1)/2
≤
(
9
8
)(s2+58s)/2
.
Thus the size of item A0 is at most 17000
(
9
8
)(s2+58s)/2
.
But this is more than n/2 by inspection of the construc-
tion. Therefore we can choose s in our construction to
satisfy 17000
(
9
8
)(s2+58s)/2 ≥ n/2; thus
s2 + 58s)/2 · log 9
8
+ log 17000 ≥ logn− 1.
and hence
(s+ 29)2 − 292 ≥ 2(logn− 1− log 17000)/ log 9
8
So,
s ≥ (2[(logn)− 1− log 17000 + 142]/ log 9
8
)1/2 − 29.
This implies
vs ≥
(
9
8
)(2 logn/ log 9
8
)1/2−29
≥ 2
√
2 log 9
8
logn−29 log 9
8
≥ 2
√
logn/2−5.
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